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Beyond Bombs and Ballots
Dispelling Myths about Democracy Assistance
-Lincoln A. Mitchell
CENTRAL component of
American foreign policy since
the First World War is now
under attack. In popular American per-
ception, democracy promotion has be-
come linked to the aggressive foreign
policy of the Bush Administration, most
notably the ongoing wars in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan. These wars are now frequently
cited to caricature all democracy assis-
tance as "bombs and ballots" initiatives
that depend excessively on military action
and elections.
Critics of democracy promotion have
emerged primarily from the left wing of
the Democratic Party and the centrist
or realist wing of the Republican Party.
Even some neoconservatives and moder-
ate Democrats have joined the chorus,
calling for a reduced emphasis on democ-
racy promotion and a return to a more
realist, if not isolationist, foreign policy.
Critics seizing on the "ballots" half of
the argument highlight the inadequacies
of elections in ensuring democracy and
their propensity to cause explosive conse-
quences if elections are introduced at the
wrong place or time-arguments offered
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in various ways by Ian Bremmer in "In
the Right Direction", from the January/
February 2007 issue, and Jack Snyder and
Edward D. Mansfied in "Prone to Vio-
lence", from the Winter 2005/06 issue.
Many critics point particularly to the pos-
sible perils of conducting early elections
in countries that are ethnically divided or
emerging from conflict.
Fair enough-but democracy assis-
tance entails more than just elections.
Scholars and practitioners have long been
aware of the dangers of relying too heavily
on elections as the midwives of peaceful
democratization. What's more, academic
debates over the ideal sequencing of insti-
tution-building and elections are of little
value to practitioners and activists within
democratizing countries, who understand
that strengthening institutions, supporting
civil society and conducting elections gen-
erally have to be done at the same time.
We would all prefer democratizing
countries to conduct elections in contexts
where cohesive and accountable political
parties elect people to strong legislatures
in a climate where the laws are understood
and enforced. There's a name for such
countries: democracies. Democratizing
countries do not meet this panoply of cri-
teria.
Elections in transitional countries are
often scheduled by the authoritarian ruler
and rigged to ensure reelection of the rul-
ing party. These types of elections raise a
different set of challenges. Democrats
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facing the prospect of a stolen election
turn to the United States and Europe
for help in somehow making the election
fair. In these cases, the West is faced with
the choice of working to make the elec-
tion fairer or ignoring the direct pleas of
activists that labor, often at great personal
risk, for democratic change. Often it is
not feasible to make the elections fair, but
supporting these activists in their work
and struggle is a different, and more com-
mon, aspect of democracy assistance.
And while it is important to recognize
that early elections have been perilous for
many democratizing countries-particu-
larly in post-conflict settings-elections
can also create or accelerate democratic
breakthroughs. It is impossible to imagine
the color revolutions in the former So-
viet Union occurring had there not been
elections around which democrats were
able to organize. Elections also played
key roles in democratic breakthroughs in
South American countries, such as Chile
and Brazil, where democratic institutions
are now relatively strong.
Countries where democracy assis-
tance has helped facilitate democratic
development might be considered the
quieter success stories of democracy as-
sistance. Examples of countries where this
has occurred over the last ten to 15 years
include many of the countries of Eastern
Europe and the Baltic states, such as Po-
land, Lithuania and Hungary, as well as
other post-authoritarian countries, such
as South Africa and, again, Chile.
A policy of supporting elections and
developing other democratic institutions
is essential to the success of democracy as-
sistance. It is important to distinguish this
from the approach of supporting elections
but only after other conditions have been
met. By connecting support for elections
to meeting pre-conditions involving the
development of other democratic institu-
tions, supporters of the latter approach
generally put themselves in the defacto po-
sition of simply opposing elections.
HE OUTSIZED role Iraq
has played in the recent un-
derstanding of democracy as-
sistance has contributed to the "bombs"
argument's claims that such a policy is
driven largely by invasions and wars. A
foreign policy that seeks to violently over-
throw dictators and thereby spread de-
mocracy makes for an easy rhetorical tar-
get. But in reality, the overwhelming ma-
jority of countries where the United States
has assisted democratic development were
never invaded by the United States.
Further, it somewhat strains credulity
and serious political analysis, when one
takes even a cursory look at Iraq's history
over the last century, to claim that the
current problems in Iraq of instability, vi-
olence, ethnic and religious divisions, and
the possibility of civil war are occurring
because it held elections. What about
the consequences of its creation by the
British, which put three different ethnic
groups in one country; the violent Ba'athi
takeover and brutal regime of Saddam
Hussein; Hussein's genocidal policies to-
wards the Kurds and brutality towards
the Shi'a, which exacerbated ethnic ten-
sions; a bloody war against Iran, which
cost hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives;
defeat at the hands of the United States
and its allies in the Persian Gulf War; the
crippling sanctions following that war;
and, finally, an even more devastating de-
feat at the hands of the United States and
Britain in the Iraq War?
Related to the "bombs" myth is the
idea that U.S. election assistance is akin
to that old wine of foreign policy, involv-
ing the anointing of U.S. proxies by force,
re-bottled today as "democratization."
There is a small kernel of truth in this as-
sertion with regard to those relatively few
democracy-assistance programs in which
armed intervention is a component. De-
mocracy-assistance efforts in countries
such as Panama, Iraq and Serbia certainly
did depose leaders who were unfriend-
ly to Washington. But in all three cases
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there is more to the story.
In Iraq and Panama, for example, the
military interventions that led to deposi-
tions of Saddam Hussein and Manuel
Noriega were not followed by installa-
tions of U.S.-picked leaders, but rather
by U.S. support of institution-building,
including elections. Some U.S. officials
initially supported various Iraqi figures,
such as Ahmad Chalabi, as the appropri-
ate successor to Hussein, but Washington
shelved such proposals, as it more clearly
understood the situation in Iraq.
And in Serbia, Milosevic was forced
to leave office after he lost an election
that he had called for ahead of sched-
ule to demonstrate his political strength.
The United States and some European
countries played a key role in training
and supporting the opposition coalition
and civic groups, which made the election
of Vojislav Kostunica possible there. But
Kostunica and the new Serbian leader-
ship have proven to be far from unwaver-
ing supporters of American interests.
In many cases, particularly in the
Middle East, democracy assistance pro-
grams have sought to help develop demo-
cratic institutions, which might lead to
changes in leadership that would not be
in the immediate interest of the United
States. Clearly, recent efforts to increase
election fairness in Egypt, expand suf-
frage in Kuwait or hold legislative elec-
tions in the Palestinian Authority have
very little to do with putting pro-Ameri-
can governments in place.
It is unavoidable that assisting de-
mocracy also means assisting democrats
at times, but most of the real work of de-
mocracy assistance is focused on building
institutions, not supporting individuals.
Helping states develop functioning, trans-
parent and accountable institutions is ar-
duous work that can take years. There
are much easier and quicker ways for the
U.S. government to get pro-American
people in positions of power than by sup-
porting democratization.
The United States also hardly has a
monopoly on democracy assistance. The
European Union works, often in coopera-
tion with the United States, to consolidate
breakthroughs and encourage nascent
democratic movements, particularly in
post-communist countries and in North
Africa. And while elections are central to
the democracy promotion debate, elec-
tion observation has been dominated in
recent years by non-American organi-
zations, for example, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe's
Office of Democracy and Human Rights
(OSCE/ODIHR), the United Nations, the
Organization of American States (OAS)
and even the International Organization
for Migration (IOM).
NOTHER CRITICISM-ex-
pressed with a tone of exasper-
ation that is usually reserved
for stating the obvious-is that democ-
racy simply can't be exported. Those on
both the left and right voice this view, as
Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) summed up
succinctly: "You cannot in my opinion
just impose a democratic form of govern-
ment on a country with no history and no
culture and no tradition of democracy."
Decades of empirical evidence, howev-
er, contradict this view. Democracy is now
strong in countries such as Costa Rica,
India, South Africa and Taiwan, which are
not exactly Western in their cultural ori-
entation. Moreover, the rapid expansion of
democracy over the last 35 years has con-
stantly pushed the boundaries of the com-
munity of democratic countries farther
away from Europe and North America.
Two of the most important success
stories in this area are Japan and Ger-
many. At the end of World War II, it was
far from obvious that Japan and Germany
would evolve in this direction, and Euro-
pean and American resources and exper-
tise were invaluable in this regard. Many
critics allude to Germany's democratic
traditions or Japan's own steps towards
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parliamentary governance, but very few
people in the United States or Europe in
1943, or even 1946, thought that Germa-
ny's pre-war democratic institutions were
strong or would serve as precedents for
the people's democratic aspirations-and
there were certainly no such expectations
for Japan.WHILE THE potential
costs of continuing an ag-
gressive policy of democ-
racy promotion are clear, the question
of the cost of discontinuing our policy of
democracy promotion has not been suffi-
ciently explored. U.S. support of democ-
racy and democratic activists over the last
15 years has not only helped strengthen
democratic institutions and consolidate
democracies, it has also changed expec-
tations and perceptions of the United
States and altered the global strategic
context for America.
It is broadly understood that the Iraq
War, for example, has made the United
States less popular in many countries. But
support for democracy in Eastern Europe
and parts of the former Soviet Union has
bolstered U.S. popularity. Still, evolving
views of the United States are more nu-
anced than this simple analysis.
There is now an expectation among
many reformers in the former Soviet
Union, Asia, Africa and, yes, even occa-
sionally the Middle East, that the United
States will support their democratic ef-
forts. This expectation coexists uneasily
within the same societies-and, in some
cases, the same individuals-that have an
increased hostility towards the United
States. It is not uncommon to witness in
countries ranging from the Middle East
to the former Soviet Union widespread
opposition to the Iraq War, coupled with
the hope that the United States will pres-
sure the native government to allow more
freedoms or to make the elections fairer.
In the former Soviet Union this is
largely due to the preponderant role the
United States is perceived to have played
in the color revolutions. Democratic
breakthroughs in Georgia and Ukraine
have raised the hopes of democratic ac-
tivists in countries such as Azerbaijan,
Armenia and Belarus. The United States
did not create these breakthroughs, as
both supporters and opponents believe,
but financial and technical support and
guidance from the United States and Eu-
rope was an integral component.
In the Middle East, the perception
of the United States with regards to de-
mocracy is far more ambiguous, where
continued support for the Saudi regime,
Israel and the ongoing military presence
in Iraq has weakened the American image
dramatically. However, support for more
inclusive elections in Egypt-and the
democratic movement in Lebanon-has
indicated to some that U.S. policy in the
region is evolving.
Many observers in the United States
have pointed to Hamas's January 2006 vic-
tory in the Palestinian elections as proof
that the Middle East is not ready for de-
mocracy. But Hamas won a very narrow
election victory. There is now a real dan-
ger that Hamas will use this victory not to
further democracy-the critics are right
about that-but to consolidate an authori-
tarian, Islamist regime. Reducing democ-
racy assistance to Palestine at this time
will likely only accelerate Hamas's move-
ment in this direction. This would be the
worst outcome for the United States, Is-
rael and Palestine. For the Palestinians, a
free media, rule of law, separation of pow-
ers, vibrant NGO sector and evolving po-
litical parties are the best defenses against
the consolidation of power and undermin-
ing of existing democratic institutions by
Hamas, a party for which less than half of
them voted. To maintain those defenses,
they need foreign support and assistance.
In general, opponents of authoritarian
regimes in the region are largely drawn
to Islamist political models and rhetoric.
Support for nascent democratic move-
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ments in these countries can offer a com-
peting model and possibly bring Islamists
into politics in a non-violent way.
And withdrawing support for dem-
ocratic movements would undermine
whatever support the United States has
earned among democrats in places as
disparate as the former Soviet Union,
southern Africa and Asia, and make anti-
democratic ideologies, some of which are
unambiguously dangerous to the United
States and its interests, more appealing.
Reducing support for democracy in coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union, such as
Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan, would help
only in the short-term to counter Russia's
influence in the region and provide al-
ternative energy sources for the United
States. It would also risk pushing the op-
ponents of these undemocratic regimes
away from the United States, expanding
Russia's power in the region and making
other models of political change more
appealing. In the case of Azerbaijan this
may mean a strengthening of its relation-
ship with its neighbor to the south: Iran.
Iraq is an unusual case because unlike
in most countries, U.S. democracy as-
sistance followed a military invasion. The
struggles and setbacks are clear to almost
all observers, and the chances of Iraq
emerging as a viable democracy seem
quite small now. This is at least partially
due to the insufficient emphasis on de-
mocracy assistance in the period imme-
diately following the collapse of Saddam
Hussein's regime. Clearly, there are no
easy solutions in Iraq. Continuing to seek
to develop democracy there will be dif-
ficult and frustrating, and it may not pre-
vent the civil war that so many observers
believe is inevitable in Iraq. But the alter-
native may be worse. Abandoning efforts
to assist those Iraqis interested in moving
their country toward democracy would
very likely speed the country's descent
into civil war. Iraqis needs institutions-
however limited and flawed-that allow
for deliberation on how to divide powers
and resolve conflicts non-violently. Now
is not the time to move away from these
goals.
F DEMOCRACY assistance
continues to become a retrofitted
rationale for misguided military
adventures like the one in Iraq, it will
become an increasingly difficult policy to
defend. The president to assume office
in 2009 will have to forge a post-Bush
democracy-assistance strategy and should
recalibrate democracy assistance to recog-
nize the changed political environment,
both domestically and internationally.
In order to change the perception of de-
mocracy assistance as just another tool
of an unpopular foreign policy, the next
president must stress the joint endeavors
with Europe and keep democracy promo-
tion distinct from other aspects of foreign
policy, most notably the War on Terror.
The challenges today are quite dif-
ferent than they were even five years ago.
There are far fewer governments that
are essentially democratically-oriented
but merely need help in implementing
reforms than there were during the initial
post-Cold War period. Democracy assis-
tance will therefore need to have a greater
focus on consolidating democratic gains in
semi-democratic countries. These coun-
tries, which have some of the structures of
democracy, can be helped to move further
and more meaningfully down the path to-
wards democracy, but this requires a shift
in policy and emphasis. Additionally, U.S.
officials must develop better strategies for
advancing democracy in semi-authoritar-
ian countries, when the leaders do not
want further democratization.
During the last sixty years, U.S. sup-
port for democratization has helped key
allies mature into democracies and helped
cement those alliances. The next admin-
istration can play a critical role in getting
this policy back on track as an important
but discreet and strategic element of U.S.
foreign policy. i-
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